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I compare the predictions of three variants of the altruistic parent model of
Barro and Becker for the relationship between child mortality and fertility. In the
baseline model fertility choice is continuous, and there is no uncertainty over the
number of surviving children. The baseline model is contrasted to an extension
with discrete fertility choice and stochastic mortality and a setup with sequential
fertility choice. Thequantitative predictionsofthemodelsare remarkably similar.
While in each model the total fertility rate falls as child mortality declines, the
number of surviving children increases. The results suggest that factors other
than declining infant and child mortality are responsible for the large decline in
net reproduction rates observed in industrialized countries over the last century.
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469-6100.1 Introduction
In 1861, the average woman in England had ﬁve children over her lifetime. However,
only 70 percent of newborn children would live to see their tenth birthday. By 1951,
average fertility had fallen to just over two children perwoman, and only ﬁve percent
of children would die in their ﬁrst ten years of life. A similar pattern of declining fer-
tility and mortality rates, collectively known as the demographic transition, has been
observed in every industrializing country. Recently, a number of economists have
developed macroeconomic theories that integrate an account of the demographic
transition with theories of long-run economic growth. However, in most cases these
studies have concentrated on the fertility aspect of the demographic transition, while
abstracting from mortality decline (see, for example, Galor and Weil 2000 and Green-
wood and Seshadri 2002). Demographers, in contrast, have pointed out that in many
countries mortality decline preceded fertility decline, which suggests a causal link
from falling mortality to falling fertility.
One reason why the macroeconomic literature has abstracted from mortality decline
as a cause for fertility decline is that commonly used economic models of fertility
choice are inconsistent with such a link. In particular, this is true for the model of
Barro and Becker (1989), where parents are altruistic towards their surviving chil-
dren. In the Barro-Becker model, infant and child mortality rates affect choices only
to the degree thattheyinﬂuencethe overall cost of asurviving child. Fallingmortality
rates lower the cost of having a surviving child, hence net fertility1 actually increases,
not decreases, as mortality declines (this is discussed in Boldrin and Jones 2002 and
Fern´ andez-Villaverde 2001). The effects of falling adult mortality are more ambigu-
ous (see Boucekkine, de la Croix, and Licandro 2002), but changing adult mortality is
an unattractive explanation for fertility decline for other reasons. Most gains in adult
survival rates are not closely associated with the timing of fertility decline, and most
of overall mortality decline occurs at the levels of infant and child mortality. Instead
of emphasizingmortality decline, the Barro-Becker framework points to the quantity-
quality tradeoff as an explanation for fertility decline: parents choose to have smaller
families in order to invest more in the education of each child.
1Throughout the paper, the number of births per woman will be referred to as the total fertility rate,
while the number of surviving children is the net fertility rate.
1In this paper, I examine whether simple extensions of the Barro-Becker model can
overturn its predictions for the link of child mortality and fertility. In the baseline
Barro-Becker model, fertility is treated as a continuous choice, all fertility decisions
are made at one point in time, and there is no uncertainty over the number of surviv-
ing children. Richer models that allow for uncertainty and sequential fertility choice
may lead to different implications. In particular, when mortality is stochastic and
parents want to avoid the possibility of ending up with very few (or zero) surviving
children, a precautionary demand for children arises. Such an increase in fertility in
response to expected future child mortality is also known as the “hoarding” effect.
Sah (1991) and Kalemli-Ozcan (2003) argue that when hoarding is taken into account,
declining child mortality can have a strong negative impact on fertility.2 If fertility
is chosen sequentially, there is also a “replacement” effect: parents may condition
their fertility decisions on the survival of children that were born previously. Fertil-
ity models with stochastic outcomes and sequential choices have been used in the
empirical fertility literature, see Wolpin (1997), but their theoretical and quantitative
implications within the Barro-Becker framework have not yet been examined.
To analyze whether stochastic outcomes and sequential fertility choice are quantita-
tively important, I examine three extensions of the basic Barro-Becker framework.
The ﬁrst model allows for different costs per birth and per surviving child, but is
otherwise identical to the Barro-Becker setup. In the second model, fertility choice
is restricted to be an integer, and there is mortality risk. The third extension adds
sequential fertility choice. The three models are compared with regards to their the-
oretical and quantitative implications regarding the link between infant and child
mortality and fertility.
The main conclusion is twofold: all three models are consistent with a falling total
fertility rate in response to declining child mortality, but none of the models predicts
that the net fertility rate declines. In the data, in most countries both total and net
fertility decline substantially during the demographic transition. In the English ex-
ample, the total fertility rate fell from 4.9 in 1861 to 2.1 in 1951, while net fertility rate
(the average number of children per woman surviving at least to age 5) declined from
3.6 to 2.0. Given these observations, our analysis suggests that lower child mortality
2In fact, in an earlier paper Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) develops a model that explains the entire fertility
decline during the demographic transition through declining child mortality alone.
2did contribute to the decline of the total fertility rates, but that other factors must be
behind the decline in net fertility.
To gain some intuition for these results, once again it is useful to distinguish between
the hoarding and replacement responses to child mortality. Replacement behavior
alone is sufﬁcient to generate a positive relationship between child mortality and to-
tal fertility. Consider, as asimple example, a parent who wants to implementa certain
target in terms of the desired number of surviving children. If fertility choice is se-
quential, the parent canimplementthis target precisely by having a sufﬁcient number
of births until the target is reached and adding another birth each time a child dies.
The number of surviving children is always equal to the target, and therefore inde-
pendent of mortality rates. The total fertility rate, on the other hand, is positively
related to mortality: the more deaths occur, the more “replacement” births are going
to take place. If child mortality declines, fewer children need to be replaced, so that
the total fertility rate declines as well.
For mortality decline to have a negative effect on net fertility, the hoarding motive
has to be present. That is, instead of just retroactively replacing children that died,
parents would have to raise their fertility level in advance as an insurance mecha-
nism against the future death of some of their children. A decline in child mortality
will translate into a decline in net fertility only if the hoarding motive is sufﬁciently
strong. We will see that, theoretically, such a response can indeed arise if it is impos-
sible to replace dying children, and if parents are extremely risk averse with regards
to to the possibility of having too few surviving children. The hoarding motive is
counteracted, however, by risk aversion with respect to consumption and by the pos-
sibility of sequential fertility choice. We will show below that once sequential fertility
choice is allowed for, hoarding behavior does not arise even if parents are highly risk
averse.
The following section introduces the three models that form the basis of the analysis.
Section 3 theoretically analyzes the link between child mortality and fertility in these
models. The theoretical results are complemented in Section 4 with quantitative ﬁnd-
ings from a calibrated model, and a sensitivity analysis is carried out in Section 5. In
Section 6, the results arecontrasted tothe empiricalliterature on thefertility-mortality
link. An extension of the model that introduces endogenous education decisions is
presented in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
32 Three Variations on Altruistic Parents and Fertility
Asthe benchmarkcase, Iconsiderthe model byBarro andBecker(1989)with continu-
ous fertility choice and separate costs per birth and per surviving child. In this model,
parents care about their own consumption c as well as the number n and utility V of





Throughout the paper, it is assumed that σ, β,  ∈ (0,1) and V > 0. The deterministic
model can be extended to risk-aversion parameters equal to one (log utility) or bigger
than one. However, in those cases the utility associated with having zero children is
negative inﬁnity, so that the choice problem under uncertainty (where zero surviving
children occur with positive probability) is not well deﬁned. I therefore concentrate
o nt h ec a s e0< σ < 1.
Let b denote the number of births, and s is the probability of survival for each child,
where 0 < s ≤ 1. Mortality is deterministic in the sense that s is the fraction of chil-
dren surviving. Consequently, the number of surviving children is not constrained to
be an integer. The full income of a parent is denoted by w.S i n c ew is taken as given,
the distinction between time and goods costs for children is irrelevant. It is assumed
that each birth is associated with a cost of p, and each surviving child entails an ad-
ditional cost of q. The budget constraint is then c + pb + qn ≤ w or, after plugging in
the survival function n = sb:
c +(p + qs)b ≤ w.
Income and cost parameters satisfy w > 0, p ≥ 0, q ≥ 0, and p + q > 0. At least
one of the costs has to be strictly positive; otherwise, the optimal fertility choice is
inﬁnity. Both consumption and fertility are restricted to be nonnegative. The decision
problem in the standard version of the Barro-Becker model is:
3If parents can choose education, V becomes an endogenous variable. Since mortality is concen-
trated in the ﬁrst few years of life, while education occurs later, there is no direct interaction between
child mortality and education decisions. Therefore, I abstract from education for now; endogenous
education decisions are introduced as an extension in Section 7 .








I will now consider two further variations of the Barro-Becker framework which add
realism to the benchmark model. The ﬁrst extension introduces stochastic survival
andrestricts fertilitychoice tobeaninteger. Inthismodel, therealizednumberofchil-
dren is uncertain. I assume that for each birth there is a constant probability of death,
implying that that the distribution of surviving children is Binomial. Apart from the
integer restriction and stochastic survival, the model is identical to the benchmark.
The decision problem is now given by:


















The second extension adds yet more realism by allowing sequential fertility choice,
while preserving the integer constraint and stochastic survival of Problem B. In the
sequential model, the period is divided into T + 1 subperiods, running from 0 to
T. Parents have a ﬁxed income of w in each subperiod. The parameter γ ∈ (0,1)
is the discount factor between periods. In each period, parents can give birth to a
single child. Since children live for multiple periods, the setup allows to distinguish
infant and child mortality. Newborn infants survive with probability si until the next
period. If the child survives, the probability of surviving the second period of life
is sy. Once a child has survived for two periods, it will survive until adulthood for
sure.4 bt ∈{ 0,1} denotes the birth decision in period t, yt ∈{ 0,1} represents a young
child (born in the preceding period), and nt is the number of older children (born
at least two periods prior) alive in period t. The cost per birth bt is given by p,a
young child yt is associated with cost q, and older children nt do not involve further
expenses.5 The budget constraint in period t is ct + pbt + qyt ≤ w.
4The model could be extendedto allow for a richer set of age-speciﬁcsurvival probabilities, but two
survival probabilities are sufﬁcient to contrast the sequential setup to the case of simultaneous fertility
choice. In the data, mortality is highly concentrated in the ﬁrst few years of a child’s life.
5This assumption can be justiﬁed through the economic beneﬁts of older children in terms of child
5In the sequential model, parents are able to decide on fertility conditional on the sur-
vival of older children. Formally, the choice object of the parent is a sequence of
decision rules {bt : Ht →{ 0,1}}T
t=0 which map the state ht at time t into a birth
decision. The state at time t is given by ht = {nt,yt},w h e r ent ≥ 0 is the number of
children that were born at leasttwo periods ago and survived, and yt ∈{ 0,1} denotes
whether there is a young child that was born in the preceding period. Since there is
at most one birth per period, the maximum number of children is K. The state space
is therefore Ht = {0,1,...,K}×{ 0,1}.
A parentisfecund only until period K, which imposes the additional constraint bt = 0
for K < t ≤ T. This constraint is imposed to provide a motive for “hoarding” of
children. If a child dies after period K,i tc a n n o tb er e p l a c e d . T h ee v o l u t i o no ft h e
number of children depends on the number of older children nt, on whether there is
a newborn bt and a young child yt, and on the survival probabilities. Speciﬁcally, for
a parent that has nt older children today, the probability of having nt + 1 tomorrow
is zero when there is no young child and sy if a young child exists. Similarly, the
probability of having a young child yt in the next period is si if there is a newborn
in this period, and zero otherwise. The probabilities over states are therefore deﬁned
recursively as:
Pt+1(n,y)= Pt(n,0)( 1 − y +( 2y − 1)bt(n,0)si) (1)
+Pt(n,1)( 1 − y +( 2y − 1)bt(n,1)si)( 1 − sy)
+Pt(n − 1,1)( 1 − y +( 2y − 1)bt(n − 1,1)si) sy.
For example, consider the probability of having three old children and one young
child in period six (n = 3, y = 1). In this case, (1) reads:
P6(3,1)=P5(3,0) b5(3,0)si + P5(3,1) b5(3,1)si (1 − sy)+P5(2,1) b5(2,1)si sy.( 2 )
The state (n = 3, y = 1) can only be reached if in period ﬁve there are either three
old children, or two old children and a young child. Therefore (2) sums over the
respective probabilities P5(3,0), P5(3,1),a n dP5(2,1) in period ﬁve. Also, there has to
labor and help in the household. The model could be extended to a richer cost proﬁle. It is impor-
tant, however, that children do not cause expenses forever, because then late-born children would be
cheaper overall than older children.
6be a birth in period ﬁve, and the infant has to survive, since otherwise there would be
no young child in period six. Therefore, each probability is multiplied by b5(n,y)si.
If the state in period ﬁve is {3,1}, there are three old children in period six only if the
young child dies. Therefore, the respective probability is also multiplied by 1 − sy.
Finally, if there are only two old children in period ﬁve, the young child has to survive
if there are to be three old children in period six. Hence, the last term is multiplied by
sy. The probability of having n children survive into adulthood is:
P(n)=PT(n,1)( 1 − sy)+PT(n,0)+PT(n − 1,1) sy.( 3 )
Birth decisions do not enter here, since there are no births in the ﬁnal period of adult-
hood T. The decision problem in the sequential model is:



















where the probabilities over states Pt(ht) and surviving children P(n) are functions
of the birth decisions as deﬁned in (1) and (3) above, and the initial probabilities are
given by P0(0,0)=1a n dP0(h0  = {0,0})=0 (adults start without children).
Model C is related to the sequential fertility choice models developed by Sah (1991)
and Wolpin (1997). In Sah’s model, costs accrue only to surviving children, there is
no limit to fecundity, and children survive for sure once they make it through the ﬁrst
period. Under the restrictions p = 0, sy = 1, and K = T our model is a special case of
Sah’s multi-period setup. Wolpin (1997) analyzes a three-period model (and employs
a multi-period version for estimation) which allows for differential survival of infants
and children and limits fecundity to the ﬁrst two periods. Model C is a special case
of Wolpin’s model under the restrictions T = 2, K = 1, σ = 0, and q = 0.
A potential limitation of Model C is that we do not allow the household to borrow
or lend in order to smooth income over time. This assumption may have an impact
on the results if there is a lot of curvature in utility. However, the sensitivity analysis
carried out in Section 5 will show that the main results are robust even when utility
is close to linear, in which case there is little desire for consumption smoothing.
73 Analytical Findings
In thissection, I examinethe effectof mortality decline on fertility inthe three variants
of the altruistic-parents model from an analytical perspective. As we will see, clear-
cut theoretical results on the mortality-fertility link are only available for a fewspecial
cases of the general model. Section 4 will complement the theoretical results derived
here with quantitative ﬁndings from a calibrated model. All proofs are contained in
the appendix.
Proposition 1 Let b(s) denote the solution to Model A as a function of s. b(s) has the
following properties:
• The number of surviving children sb(s) is non-decreasing in s.
• If p = 0 and q > 0, fertility b(s) is decreasing in s and sb(s) is constant.
• If p > 0 and q = 0, fertility b(s) is increasing in s.
The intuition for these results is simple. Since parents care only about surviving
children and there is no uncertainty, the survival probability s affects choices only
through the full cost of a surviving child p/s + q.R a i s i n g s lowers this cost, and
through the substitution effect therefore increases the number of surviving children.
In the special case where the cost p for each birth is zero, the total cost of a surviving
child is independent of s, and consequently parents choose the preferred number
of surviving children irrespective of s. This implies that the total number of births
declines in inverse proportion to s as the survival probability increases.
When the cost component speciﬁc to surviving children q is zero, the cost of a surviv-
ing child is inversely proportional to s. The reaction of the number of births b(s) to
changes in s now depends on the price elasticity of the demand for (surviving) chil-
dren. Given the assumptions 0 <   < 1a n d0< σ < 1, this elasticity is bigger than
one, so that the total number of births rises as the survival probability increases.
In summary, we see that in the deterministic model net fertility always rises as the
survival probability increases. What happens to the total number of births depends
on which cost component dominates. If a major fraction of the total cost of children
8accrues for every birth, fertility would tend to increase with the survival probability;
the opposite holds if children are expensive only after surviving infancy.
I turn to the stochastic models next.
Proposition 2 Let b(s) denote the solution to Model B as a function of s. If p = 0,t h e
optimal choice b(s) is non-increasing in s.
Proposition 3 Let bt(ht)(si) denote the solution to Model C as function of the infant sur-
vival probability si at a given state ht.I fp= 0 and sy = 1,b t(ht)(si) is non-increasing in
si.
Thus in both stochastic models, we ﬁnd that if there is no birth-speciﬁc cost, the op-
timal number of births declines as survival rates increase. The intuition from the
deterministic model therefore carries over to the stochastic case. Only surviving chil-
dren are costly, and surviving children is all the parents care about. Consequently,
parents adjust their fertility to stay close to their preferred level of fertility. Notice,
however, that even if p = 0 in the stochastic model parents are no longer indiffer-
ent with regards to s. A higher survival probability reduces uncertainty about the
number of surviving children, which, given risk aversion, increases expected utility.
In the sequential model, in the case p = 0 we can also show that age at ﬁrst birth
(weakly) increases with the survival probability. There are no clear-cut results, how-
ever, regarding net fertility. If utility is highly concave in n, parents want to avoid a
low number of surviving children. If mortality is high, this can give rise to a precau-
tionary demand for children or “hoarding,” which declines as mortality (and there-
fore uncertainty) decreases. However, the opposite effect is also possible, since utility
is concave in consumption as well. If parents are very risk averse in terms of con-
sumption, they might want to avoid the risk of having too many surviving children
(and therebyhighexpenditureson children), which would lowerthe numberofbirths
when mortality is high. While these effects apply in principle to both Model B and
Model C, the model with sequential fertility choice is in some sense in between the
deterministic and the stochastic model. Since choices are spread out over time, in this
case parents have the possibility of replacing children that die early in the life cycle,
leading to less uncertainty over the realized number of children than in Problem B,
where all children are born simultaneously.
9For similar reasons, no general results are available for the case p > 0, even if q = 0.
In the deterministic model, in this case total fertility b(s) increases in s. In the stochas-
tic model, the opposite may be true if the precautionary motive for having children
is important. Consider the case of a parent whose primary concern, due to high risk
aversion, is to avoid being left without any surviving children. Fertility will be high-
est when mortality is high as well, since the parent has to rely on a “law of large
numbers.” The number of births would decline if an increased survival probability
lowered uncertainty about the number of surviving children.
The theoretical analysis identiﬁes two important factors which inﬂuence the child
mortality-fertility nexus: the relative cost of dying and surviving children, and the
degree of riskaversion regarding the numberof surviving children. Since both factors
depend nontrivially on model parameters, the question whether reductions in child
mortality increase or decrease net fertility is ultimately quantitative in nature.
4 Quantitative Findings
The analytical results show that all three models are consistent with declining total
fertility rates (i.e., number of births) in response to falling mortality. However, we
are left without a clear-cut prediction for the relationship of child mortality to net
fertility (i.e., number of survivors). Only the deterministic model unambiguously
predicts that the number of surviving children will rise as mortality falls. In the more
elaborate stochastic models, the relationship could go either way. Therefore, I assess
the quantitative predictions of the models with a calibration exercise. Each model
is parameterized to reproduce mortality and fertility rates in England in 1861, when
infant and child mortality was still high. I then increase the survival parameters to
correspond to mortality rates in 1951 (by which time most of the fall in infant and
child mortality had been completed) and compare the predictions of each model for
the impact on fertility rates.
The models are parameterized as follows. In the sequential model, we set T = 14 and
K = 12, so that the maximum number of births is 13. Income w is a scale parameter
and is set to 1 per period in the sequential model and 14 in the other models. The
parameter p corresponds to the cost of a child until its ﬁrst birthday, while the pa-
10rameter q accounts for the remaining cost. In terms of goods, it is natural to assume
that the yearly cost increases until the child is able to work and partly pay for itself.
The time cost, on the other hand, decreases over time. In addition, the cost per birth
should account for the cost of pregnancy and the risk of the mother’s death during
childbirth. Since time and goods cost move in opposite directions, I assume as the
baseline case that overall cost is proportional to age, and that children are no longer a
net burden once they are six years old. I therefore set q/p = 5. The overall level of the
cost parameters is set such that in the sequential model, a household with both an in-
fant and a young child spends half of its income on the children. This gives p = 1/12
and q = 5/12. The curvature parameters in the utility function are set to σ =   = 1/2,
and the discount factor in the sequential model is γ = 0.95. The children’sutility level
V is equated to the parent’s utility in each case (i.e., the steady-state utility that would
obtain with constant income and mortality rates).
The survival parameters are chosen to correspond to the situation in England in 1861.
According to Preston, Keyﬁtz, and Schoen (1972) the infant mortality rate (death rate
until ﬁrst birth rate) was 16 percent, while the child mortality rate (deathrate between
ﬁrst and ﬁfth birthday) was 13 percent. Accordingly, I set si = 0.84 and sy = 0.87 in
the sequential model, and s = sisy = 0.73 in the other models. Finally, the altruism
factor β is set in each model to match the total fertility rate, which was 4.9 in 1861
(Chesnais 1992). Since fertility choice is discrete in Models B and C, I chose a total
fertility rate of 5.0 as the target.
Each model is thus calibrated to reproduce the relationship of fertility and infant and
child mortality in 1861. I now examine how fertility adjusts when mortality rates fall
to the level observed in 1951, which is 3 percent for infant mortality and 0.5 percent
for child mortality. The results for fertility can be compared to the observed total
fertility rate of 2.1 in 1951.
In Model A (Barro-Becker with continuous fertility choice), the total fertility rate falls
from 5.0 (the calibrated target) to 4.2 when mortality rates are lowered to the 1951
level. The expected number of surviving children increases from 3.7 to 4.0. Thus,
there is a small decline in total fertility, but (aswasto be expected given Proposition 1)
an increase in the net fertility rate.
Perhaps surprisingly, the results generated by Model B (stochastic Barro-Becker with
discrete fertility choice) are very similar to Model A. In the stochastic model, total
11fertility falls from 5.0 to 4.0, and net fertility increases from 3.7 to 3.9. Fertility falls by
more than in the deterministic model, but the difference is small.
In Model C (sequential fertility choice), the total fertility rate is not an integer since
it depends on the random individual mortality realizations. Therefore, β was chosen
to move the total fertility rate to 5.2, which is the closest possible match to the target
of 5.0. When mortality is lowered to 1951 levels, fertility falls only to 5.0, while net
fertility increases substantially from 3.8 to 4.8. These results are partly due to the fact
that the sequential model distinguishes infant and child mortality, while the other
models do not. The sequential model probably overstates the cost of child mortality,
since we assume that the entire cost q has to be paid if a child dies, even though most
of child mortality is concentrated near the beginning of the interval from one to ﬁve
years of age. The models line up more closely if we set sy = 1 and assign the entire
fall in mortality to infant mortality si (as we do implicitly in the other two models).
In this case, total fertility falls from 5.1 to 4.0, while net fertility increases from 3.7 to
3.9. This is identical to the results with Model B.
Figures 1 to 3 show that the predictions of the models are similar for the entire range
of possible infant mortality rates (the solid line is the total fertility rate, and the dotted
line is the net fertility rate; for Figure 3, child mortality was set to sy = 1). The se-
quential model yields additional predictions for the age at ﬁrst birth, which increases
with the survival probability once si is at least 10 percent (Figure 4). This increase
not only reﬂects the corresponding decline in total fertility, but also narrower spacing
of births. When mortality is high, parents start having children early so that there
is time to make up for children who die. This replacement motive is less important
when survival rates are high.
In terms of guiding the applied researcher, our results show that once the differential
cost of dying and surviving children is accounted for, the deterministic Barro-Becker
model leads to virtually the same conclusions as the stochastic model with sequen-
tial fertility choice. Thus, unless questions concerning birth order and timing are of
particular interest (as in Caucutt, Guner, and Knowles 2002), the basic model can be
used as a stand-in for the more elaborate setup.
In all computations, the children’s utility V was held constant. However, results are
virtually unchanged if V is adjusted to reﬂect the steady-state utility at each value of
s. This utility increases in s since the cost of surviving children falls as s increases,
12while uncertainty is reduced. If the effect of s on utility were taken into account, we
would observe an additional upward effect on (both net and gross) fertility rates as s
increases. Quantitatively, this effect is small. We also disregard the increase in income
per capita over the period, since with the chosen functional forms fertility is indepen-
dent of the level of income, as long as the cost of children is proportional to income.
This is approximately true if a major part of the cost of children is either a direct time
cost or is tied to the level of wages. If there is a sizable goods component in the cost of
children, children become relatively more affordable as wages rise, which once again
would exert an upward effect on fertility. Thus, accounting for the dependency of V
on s or the effect of rising wages can only strengthen our basic conclusions.
In summary, each model predicts that total fertility falls with infant mortality, but
none of the models predicts a fall in net fertility rates. Relative to the data, the models
suggest that only a small proportion of observed fertility decline, and none of the net
fertility decline, is accounted for by declining infant mortality.
5 Sensitivity of the Results
The quantitative results in the preceding section were obtained for speciﬁc, calibrated
parameter values. The question arises whether the results are sensitive to the choice
of parameters. In other words, are there reasonable parameter values for which any
of the models predict a substantial decline in net fertility as infant mortality declines?
We know from Proposition 1 that this can never be the case in Model A. In the other
models, however, a “precautionary” demand for children can arise if parents’ utility
is highly concave in the number of children, but close to linear in consumption. The
curvature of utility is governed by the parameters σ and  . To examine the sensitivity
of the results, the computations were repeated with σ and   varying independently
from 0.01 to 0.99 (on a grid with four values per parameter, or 16 possible combina-
tions). In each case, the discount factor β was adjusted to keep fertility at 5.0 given
observed mortality rates in 1861. As was to be expected, we ﬁnd that in Model B a
precautionary demand for children arises if risk aversion with respect to children is
high, while risk aversion with respect to consumption is low. In Model C with se-
quential fertility choice, however, the relationship between mortality and fertility is
surprisingly robust with respect to the choice of utility parameters. Speciﬁcally, we
13did not ﬁnd a single case where in an increase in the survival probability results in
substantial net fertility decline.
To illustrate this point, let us consider the extreme case of σ =   = 0.01. Here utility
from consumption is close to linear, while risk aversion with regards to the number
of surviving children is high. The discount factor β is adjusted to keep fertility at 5.0
given 1861 mortality rates. If we now lower mortality rates to the level of 1951, in
Model B total fertility falls from 5.0 to 2.0, and net fertility from 3.7 to 1.9. This effect
disappears entirely, however, when we move (with the same parameters) to the more
realistic sequential model, where parents can replace children who die early. Here,
despite the high risk-aversion with regards to the number of children, total fertility
drops only to 4.0, and net fertility rises to 3.9, just as with the benchmark parameters.
Figures 5 and 6 show fertility rates over the entire range of mortality rates in the two
models. Thus, in the sequential setup the conclusion that mortality decline raises
net fertility is robust to different preference speciﬁcations, even if we deliberately
emphasize the precautionary motive for hoarding children.
Another parameter which could potentially have an important impact on the results
is the fecundity limit K in the sequential model. If less time is available to replace
children once mortality is experienced, the hoarding motive might be expected to
become more important. In the computations, however, this did not turn out to be
the case. As long as K > 7, the results were virtually unaffected by the choice of K.
For K ≤ 6, the fertile period is too short for fertility rates to increase signiﬁcantly
as the survival probability declines, which limits the possibility of hoarding. Once
again, the basicconclusion remainsthatnetfertility doesnotfallasmortality declines,
regardless of the choice of K.
Finally, the total cost of children and its distribution between a cost per birth and per
surviving child might inﬂuence the results. We know from the theoretical results that
the hoarding motive is more likely to be important if the cost per birth is low. How-
ever, even in the extreme case of p = 0 (cost per birth is zero) the model predictions
change very little from what is displayed in Figures 1 to 6. In the sequential model
with p = 0 and the utility parameters σ =   = 0.01 (the case most favorable for the
hoarding motive) net fertility increases by 0.2 if mortality is lowered from 1861 to
1951 levels, just as in the baseline case. Likewise, varying the overall cost of children
(relative to income) has hardly any effect, as long as we adjust the discount factor to
14control for initial fertility.
The overall results of the sensitivity analysis suggest that at least in the sequential
fertility choice model(which isthe most realistic case)the curvature of utility haslittle
effect on the child mortality-fertility relationship. The possibility of replacing a child
after a death occurs implies that the hoarding motive playsonly a minor role. Instead,
child mortality affects fertility chieﬂy through the total cost of surviving children,
which is exactly the channel emphasized by the deterministic Barro-Becker model.
This also explains why the predictions of the deterministic and the sequential model
are remarkably similar in a variety of circumstances.
6 Theoretical Results versus Empirical Findings
The analysis in the preceding sections led to a clear conclusion. Over the empirically
relevant range of mortality rates, a reduction in child and infant mortality results in
a decline in total fertility rates, but not in net fertility rates. In this section, I contrast
these theoretical predictions to empirical evidence on the child mortality-fertility link.
While there is inevitable variation in the empirical results, the preponderance of the
available evidence supports the predictions of the theoretical model.
A signiﬁcant part of the empirical literature focuses on the experience of Western Eu-
ropean countries during the demographic transition. To provide a ﬁrst impression of
the data, Figures 9 to 13 plot the evolution of birth rates and infant mortality rates
from 1835 to 1940 in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Sweden, as well as the
United States.6 In each case, fertility and infant mortality decline substantially over
the period. However, there is nogeneralpattern regarding therelative timingof fertil-
ity and mortality decline. In the United Kingdom, substantial fertility decline started
before 1880. Infant mortality was still high at the time, and actually rose during the
ﬁrst two decades of substantial fertility decline. Infant mortality started declining
rapidly only after 1900. The British experience therefore suggests that mortality de-
cline follows fertility decline. France had a similar experience. Fertility was already
in decline in 1830, and the downward trend continued throughout the nineteenth
6Birth rates were used instead of total fertility rates since they are more widely available, especially
at the beginning of the period.
15century. Infant mortality, in contrast, stayed high until close to 1900. The experi-
ence of the U.K. and France therefore appears to contradict the hypothesis that infant
mortality decline was a main causing factor of fertility decline during the transition.
The situation is different, however, inGermany and Sweden. Inboth cases, sizable re-
ductions in infant mortality took place before the main phase of fertility decline. Sub-
sequently, fertility and infant mortality fell in tandem as the demographic transition
p r o g r e s s e d . T h eU . S .d a t ai sl e s sr e l i a b l ea nd partially based on estimates, because
comprehensive registration of deaths and births did not occur before the twentieth
century. Nevertheless, the pattern bears some similarity to the French example. Fer-
tility fell from the beginning of the nineteenth century, whereas infant mortality was
substantially reduced only after 1880.
Our cursory examination of the evidence does not reveal a clear one-way link from
mortality decline to fertility decline, or, for that matter, the other way around. A
more comprehensive review of the European evidence from this period is provided
by van de Walle (1986). Using province level data from a variety of countries, van
de Walle computes the correlation of the change in fertility with the change in infant
mortality during the period 1870 to 1930. If infant mortality declines were a major
cause offertility decline, we would expect the correlation to be positive. However, the
results are mixed at best. In most cases, the estimated correlation is not signiﬁcantly
different from zero; the few signiﬁcantly positive estimates are offset by others which
are signiﬁcantly negative. Van de Walle also considers the relative timing of fertility
and mortality decline in different provinces of a country. The start of the fertility or
mortality transition is deﬁned as the ﬁrst time when the respective index is at least 10
percent below its pre-transition level. Again, the evidence is mixed. In Switzerland,
in the vast majority of districts infant mortality decline precedes fertility decline. In
Germany, there is an about equal number of districts with fertility or mortality falling
ﬁrst. In the case of Belgium and England, ﬁnally, fertility generally declines before
infant mortality does.
The German case is analyzed in more detail by Galloway, Lee, and Hammel (1998),
who examine family-level data from Prussia in the period 1875 to 1910. Unlike most
empirical studies, Galloway, Lee, and Hammel employ two-stage least squares esti-
mation to deal with potential two-way causality between child mortality and fertility.
In regressions that exploit the cross-sectional variation across cities and districts in
16their data set, little evidence for a signiﬁcant relationship of child mortality and fer-
tility is found. On the other hand, when a ﬁxed effect for each district is introduced
(so that only the time-series variation in each district is exploited) a strong positive
relationship between child mortality and fertility arises. In rural districts, fertility
changes with mortality about one-to-one, while the reaction in cities is even larger.
The estimates therefore would imply that, at least in the cities, mortality decline led
to a reduction in net fertility rates. It is not clear, however, how reliable these esti-
mates are. Both fertility and mortality have a strong downward time trend during the
period considered, which could lead to biased and imprecise estimates. The authors
themselves state that their ﬁxed-effect estimates probably overstate the true effect of
child mortality on fertility.
A similar study using more recent data is carried out by Rosero-Bixby (1998), who
analyzes county-level data from Costa Rica during the fertility transition. Apart from
demographic data, the data set includes a variety of county characteristics which
could also affect fertility. Once these other county-speciﬁc effects are controlled for,
no evidence in favor of a causal link from child mortality decline to fertility decline
during the transition is found.
The causes of fertility decline during the demographic transition in Sweden are ex-
amined by Eckstein, Mira, and Wolpin (1999). Their study is particularly relevant
from the perspective of this paper, since long-run empirical data is analyzed using an
estimated dynamic model of fertility choice. The model allows for multiple life-cycle
periods, multiple births, and includes goods and time costs for children. As in the
models discussed here, there is a cost differential between surviving and dying chil-
dren: the goods accrues for all children, whereas the time cost only applies if a child
survives to the next period. Compared to the sequential modelpresented in Section 2,
the most important difference is that mortality is deterministic. A given percentage of
children survives until the next period, so there is no uncertainty about the number
of surviving children.
The model parameters are chosen to ﬁt model predictions to Swedish data on child
and adult mortality rates, fertility rates, and real wages from 1736 and 1946. Us-
ing the estimated model, Eckstein, Mira, and Wolpin perform a series of counterfac-
tual experiments to determine the contributions of different potential explanations
to overall fertility decline. In order to isolate the role of infant and child mortality,
17the authors feed the historical pattern of declining infant and child mortality into the
model, while holding wages and adult mortality constant. The resulting predictions
of the model are consistent with our ﬁndings: the total fertility rate falls in response
to declining mortality, but the net fertility rate increases. A similar experiment using
adult mortality rates reveals only a weak relationship between adult mortality and
fertility. When the effect of rising wages is isolated, both total and net fertility rates
decline, if only by a relatively small amount.
A particularly interesting result is that the combined effect of raising wages and low-
ering infant and child mortality at the same time much exceeds the sum of the two
effects in isolation. To see the intuition for this result, recall that rising wages lower
fertility through a substitution effect, since the time cost of raising children increases.
When infant mortality falls, this time cost makes up a larger fraction of the total cost
of a child, since the additional goods cost has to be paid regardless whether a child
survives. Therefore, when mortality is low, rising wages have a relatively larger effect
on the total cost of a child, which ampliﬁes the impact on fertility rates. Thus, while
child mortality decline per se does not decrease net fertility, it still contributes indi-
rectly through the interaction with rising wages. In Section 7 we will explore whether
a similar effect can arise in our model.
In addition to evidence related to fertility decline during the demographic transition,
there is also a sizable empirical literature which uses cross-sectional data to assess the
link of child mortality and fertility. In a seminal study, Ben-Porath (1976) analyzes a
retrospective survey of the birth history of married women in Israel. Based on data
for the period 1960-1963, Ben-Porath ﬁnds strong evidence for the replacement effect.
That is, experiencing the death of a child increases the number of births and reduces
the intervals between births. The degree of replacement varies with the origin of the
mother and the birth order. For example, among mothers of Asianor African descent,
close to 80 percent of child deaths are replaced at birth order 2 or 3. The replacement
effect declines at higher birth orders, and is generally weaker for mothers of Israeli,
European, or American descent. Since the replacement effect is always below 100
percent, in all cases a decline in mortality would imply an increase in net fertility.
Knodel (1978) emphasizes that in addition to deliberate attempts to control fertility,
child mortality decline can also affect fertility when any deliberate fertility control
is absent. It has long been recognized that breastfeeding tends to delay further preg-
18nancy. The death of an infant therefore raises the probability of further births through
the premature interruption of breastfeeding. Knodel compares the effect of infant
m o r t a l i t yo ns u b s e q u e n tb i r t h si nG e r m a na n dF r e n c hr e g i o n si nd i f f e r e n tt i m ep e -
riods between 1640 to 1900, mostly from the period before the onset of substantial
fertility decline. Conﬁrming the physiological link between child mortality and fer-
tility, Knodel ﬁnds is that the effect of a child’s death on fertility is particularly small
in areas where breastfeeding is known to be uncommon.
Haines (1998) provides a study using data from the 1900 and 1910 U.S. censuses
which allows a separation of replacement and hoarding effects. He ﬁnds that at at the
turn of the century, between 10 to 30 percent of child deaths were replaced through
higher subsequent fertility. The hoarding effect is estimated to amount to 30 to 50
percent of a child per death, resulting in a total effect in the neighborhood of 60 to
80 percent. Once again, these numbers imply that fertility decline would raise total
fertility, but lower net fertility.
A number of studies of fertility behavior in developing countries ﬁnd that factors
other than replacement and hoarding behavior have to be taken into account to inter-
pret the evidence. Using data from Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Peru for the
years 1969-1970, Rutstein and Medica (1978) come to the surprising ﬁnding that in a
number of regions rises in infant mortality lead to a decrease in subsequent fertility.
The authors conjecture that the health problem leading to the death of the child (usu-
ally an infectious disease) might also affect the mother, thereby shortening fecundity
and subsequent fertility. Also, in a number of regions fertility is close to the natural
limit, leaving little room for a replacement effect. In an analysis of data from Tai-
wan, Heer and Wu (1978) put the spotlight on a yet another variable: the sex of the
child. While the death of a child generally increases subsequent fertility, the increase
is signiﬁcantly lower if there are already three surviving sons as opposed to three sur-
viving daughters. Defo (1998) ﬁnds that in Cameroon, birth order matters. The death
of a ﬁrst child has a much larger impact on completed fertility than the death of a
child higher in the birth order. Gender also matters, with surviving boys lowering
the probability of further pregnancies. Defo attributes this result to the special role
played by ﬁrst-borns in Cameroonian culture.
To summarize, the majority of the cross-sectional studies ﬁnd strong evidence in fa-
vor of a replacement effect: fertility increases after the death of a child is experienced.
19This increase is generally less than one-to-one, however, so that lost children are not
replaced completely. The cross-section evidence therefore supports the main conclu-
sions of our model, namely, that total fertility falls and net fertility increases as child
mortality rates decline. Inaddition, the empiricalstudies show that anumberof other
factors not captured in our theoretical modelsalso matter for the mortality-fertility re-
lationship. Examples include the physiological effect which arises from interrupted
breastfeeding, as well as the differential response to a child’s death depending on the
sex of the existing children.
7 An Extension with Endogenous Education Decisions
The main result of this study so far is a negative one, namely, falling child mortality
is unlikely to have caused the large decline in net fertility observed during the de-
mographic transition. However, our theoretical framework is consistent with other
explanations of the same facts. In particular, a number of authors7 who use the Barro-
Becker model interpret fertility decline as a quantity-quality substitution: parents
have fewer children in order to invest more in each child. In this section, I extend
Model A8 by allowing the parents to invest into the education of their children. This
education choice introduces a quantity-quality tradeoff which can serve as an expla-
nation for fertility decline. I then explore whether infant and child mortality interacts
with the quantity-quality tradeoff. Eckstein, Mira, and Wolpin (1999)point out that in
their model such an interaction is important: mortality reductions per se increase net
fertility, but in combination with rising real wages they can amplify the negative total
effect on fertility. As we will see, our model does not lead to the same conclusion.
To the contrary, allowing for endogenous education choice strengthens the positive
effect of mortality decline on net fertility.
In the extended model, a parent can invest fraction e of its time in the education of its
7Examples include Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990), de la Croix and Doepke (2003), Doepke
(2001), and Fern´ andez-Villaverde (2001).
8For simplicity, the exposition is limited to the deterministic model. We already established that
the deterministic and the sequential model have very similar implications for the link between child
mortality and fertility. The extension considers investments which are best thought of as taking place
after mortality or survival have been realized. That is, we are considering a stage where the remaining
choice problem of optimally investing in children is identical in all three versions.
20surviving children. We assume that the cost only accrues to surviving children, since
by deﬁnition child mortality affects children under the age of six, the age at which
(formal) education usually begins.9 The remaining ﬁxed costs p (per birth) and q (per
surviving child) are expressed asfractions of the parent’s time as well. The distinction
between time and goods costs was immaterial for the analysis so far, but it will play
an important role here. Assuming that all costs are in terms of time implies that the
total cost of children is proportional to income.10
To introduce a motive for education, a person’s income now has two components.
There is a basic wage w for “raw labor” that a person gets regardless of their educa-
tion, and an additional wage w per unit of human capital h.T h ee d u c a t i o np r o v i d e d
bypar ent sisc o nv er t edint oc hildr en’shumanc apit alh  bya concave, increasingfunc-
tion h(e) which satisﬁes h(0)=0. Under the assumption that wages and the survival
probability s are constant, the parent’s utility can be described by a value function






+ βn V(h )

subject to:
c =(w+ wh)(1 − pb − (q + e)n),
n =sb,
h  =h(e).
In the endogenous education framework, two potential determinants of fertility de-
cline can be distinguished: changes in the survival probability s, and changes in the
importance of human capital, as measured by the wage w. To assess the relative im-
portance of these factors, the model has to be solved numerically. The value function
V(h) and the optimal policy functions n(h), b(h),a n de(h) can be computed through
value function iteration. The predictions of the model for a given set of parameters
9Our results would be modiﬁed if education started before child mortality is realized, since then
mortality reductions would lower the effective cost of education (see Kalemli-Ozcan 2002 and Soares
2003). However, since most education occurs after age six, and most of child mortality is concentrated
at the youngest ages, quantitatively this effect is bound to be small.
10If we assumed that some of the costs were in terms of goods, the total cost of children would
decline relative to income as wages grow, leading to higher fertility than in the case of time costs.
21are evaluated at the steady state level of human capital ¯ h, that is, the level of human
capital that satisﬁes ¯ h = h(e(¯ h)).
The calibration of the endogenous education model follows the same strategy used
for the other models. Hence, the model parameters are chosen to match observed
mortality and fertility rates in 1861. As far as possible, the same parameters were
used as in the baseline calibration of Model A. We therefore set σ =   = 0.5, w = w =
14 × 2




where A is chosen such that h = 1/2 obtains in the initial steady state. Notice that
given these parameters, total income w + wh matches its value of 14 in the original
calibration. Finally, β is chosen to match the observed total fertility rate of 5.0 in 1861,
given the actual infant and child mortality rates in that year.
Figure 7 shows the relationship between child mortality and fertility in the model
given the 1861 calibration. The value function was computed separately for each
value of the survival probability, and steady state fertility rates are displayed for each
s. As in Model A, we observe that the relationship between s and total fertility is
hump-shaped, while net fertility is strictly increasing in s. The key difference to Fig-
ure 1 (which displays the same relationship in Model A without the education choice)
is that the maximum fertility level is signiﬁcantly lower with endogenous education
choice. In Figure 1, the total fertility rate peaks at 7.8 when the mortality rate is
s = 0.2, while in Figure 7 the maximum is 6.2 at s = 0.35.
Let us now consider the observed fertility and mortality rates in 1951. By increasing
the human-capital component w of the total wage (or, equivalently, the productivity
A of the education technology h(e)), we can induce a quantity-quality substitution
which lowers the total fertility rate to the observed level of 2.1 in 1951, given the
survival probability of s = 0.965 in that year.12 Figure 8 shows the entire relationship
between mortality and fertility for this calibration. As in all models considered so
far, net fertility is strictly increasing in s, and total fertility is hump-shaped with a
11Notice that the original costs of p = 1/12 and q = 5/12 aredivided by the total wage w+wh = 14,
since they are now interpreted as a time cost.
12To achieve this, w has to increase by a factor of 3.05, which is smaller than the observed increase
in real wages over the same period.
22maximum fertility rate of 2.8.
Figure 8 also helps to answer the question whether mortality decline contributed
to fertility decline through an interaction with the quantity-quality tradeoff. What
would have happened if wages had increased as assumed in the calibration, but mor-
tality rates had stayed at their 1861 level? The answer can be read off Figure 8 at the
1861 mortality rate of s = 0.73: The total fertility rate would have been 2.4, and the
net fertility rate 1.8. This compares to total and net fertility rates of 2.1 and 2.0 under
the actual mortality rate of s = 0.965. Thus, had mortality remained at its 1861 level,
the decline in the net fertility rate would have been even larger than it was in reality.
Mortality decline therefore did not contribute to declining net fertility, even through
the indirect route.
It is instructive to compare this result to Eckstein, Mira, and Wolpin (1999), who ﬁt a
theoretical model of fertility choice to Swedish data, and carry out a series of coun-
terfactual experiments to assess the contributions of child mortality decline and wage
increases to fertility decline. Concentrating on the period 1856 to 1946, they ﬁnd that
mortality decline alone with wages held constant at their initial level would have
lowered the total fertility rate by 0.62. Feeding only the observed wage increase into
the model while holding mortality constant leads to decrease in total fertility of 0.85.
T h es u mo ft h et w oi s o l a t e de f f e c t si st h e r e fore a decline of 1.47. If both mortality and
wages change at the time, however, the combined effect is a decline of 1.81, which
much exceeds the sum of the individual effects. Let us now consider the same cal-
culations in our model with endogenous education choice. Starting from the 1861
calibration, raising the survival probability from 0.73 to 0.965 while holding wages
constant lowers the total fertility rate by 0.8. Increasing wages by a factor of 3.05
while holding mortality constant lowers total fertility by 2.6. The sum of the two
isolated effects is therefore a decline of 3.4 in total fertility, which compares to a com-
bined effect of minus 2.9 if both changes take place at the same time. Thus, in our
model the combined effect is smaller than the sum of the two isolated effects.
Thus, unlike in Eckstein, Mira, and Wolpin (1999), child mortality decline does not
amplify the negative effect of rising wages on fertility. The results differ because
wages affect fertility through a different channel in the two models. The model of
Eckstein, Mira, and Wolpin does not allow for investments in children. The level of
wages affects fertility through an income and a substitution effect. Fertility falls as
23wages rise because the substitution effect is stronger than the income effect. If child
mortality is low, the time cost (which depends on the wage) makes up a larger part
of the total cost of children. This ampliﬁes the substitution effect and leads to a larger
fertility decline in response to wages.
In the Barro-Becker model, a change in the level of wages per se (holding education
constant) does not change fertility: the substitution effect and the income effect ex-
actly offset each other13. However, the level ofwages can still affect fertility indirectly,
through the optimal choice of child quality versus child quantity. As wages rise, child
quality becomes more attractive, which raises education and lowers fertility. Notice,
however, that a decline in child mortality does nothing to amplify this effect. Quite to
the contrary, a decline in child mortality lowers the cost of every child, which tends to
favor quantity over quality. Indeed, in the computations underlying Figures 7 and 8
the optimal education choice e declines as the survival probability s rises.
The Barro-Becker model with endogenous education choice does not conﬁrm the
ﬁnding of Eckstein, Mira, and Wolpin (1999) that declining child mortality ampliﬁes
the negative effect of wages on fertility. While such an effect is possible if prefer-
ences are non-homothetic (as in Eckstein, Mira, and Wolpin), it cannot arise through
an interaction of child mortality with a quantity-quality tradeoff in the decisions on
children. To the extent that increased investment in the quality of children is respon-
sible for fertility decline, child mortality is not an important contributor even on the
indirect route.
8 Conclusions
All of the models discussed in this paper lead to the same conclusion: declines in
child mortality lower total fertility rates, but do not cause decreases in net fertility.
T h eﬁ n d i n g sa r er o b u s tw i t hr e s p e c tt ot h ei n c lusion of stochastic mortality, sequential
fertility choice, and endogenous education decisions. The empirical evidence on the
mortality-fertility relationship is also consistent with our ﬁndings.
13This result is based on two assumptions: homothetic preferences, and proportionality of wages
and the cost of children
24The basic intuition for the results is simple. If what parents care about is surviving
children, a reduction in mortality implies that the cost of having a surviving child
declines. Assuming that children are a normal good, we would expect a rise in the
demand for children, and therefore an increase in the net fertility. What happens to
overall fertility then depends on the price elasticity of demand for children. If de-
mand is very elastic, the total fertility rate could increase as mortality declines. How-
ever, if mortality is relatively low already, a further decline in mortality induces only
a small change in the overall cost of having a child. We would therefore expect that at
low mortality rates a further reduction in mortality leads to a less-than-proportional
increase in net fertility, and therefore a decrease in total fertility. The results in Fig-
ures 1 to 8 bear this out: in each model, the total fertility rate increases in the survival
probability s for low s (where an increase in s has a large effect on the total cost of a
surviving child), but the relationship turns around for high s.
Our quantitative analysis shows that these ﬁndings stay intact even if we account for
stochastic mortality and sequential fertility choice. Contrary to our results, a number
of existing studies argue that with stochastic mortality a large precautionary demand
for children arises, which would lead to a negative effect of mortality decline on net
fertility. There are two reasons why we come to different conclusions than the exist-
ing literature. First, the risk-aversion argument cuts both ways. Parents who decide
to have a very large number of children are hedging against many of them dying,
but at the same time they expose themselves to the risk of many of them surviv-
ing, meaning that they would have to support a large group of children and would
have to lower their own consumption. Hence, risk aversion with respect to the par-
ent’s own consumption tends to work against a precautionary demand for children.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the sequential nature of fertility choice also
tends to lower the precautionary demand for children. Since most of mortality is
concentrated very early in life, parents can adopt a “wait-and-see” stance, produce
their desired number of children, and simply replace those that happen to die early
in life. This replacement strategy is not perfect, because fecundity is limited and it
might turn out to be impossible to get another child. Nevertheless, the possibility of
replacement greatly mitigates the precautionary demand for children, to the extent
that in the calibrated model it is nearly impossible to generate such a demand.
Even though we do not assign an important to role to child mortality decline per se,
25our results do not rule out that mortality decline might interact with other explana-
tions for fertility decline. For example, in the model by Eckstein, Mira, and Wolpin
(1999), child mortality decline ampliﬁes the effect of rising wages on fertility. We ﬁnd
that such an ampliﬁcation effect does not occur, however, if a quantity-quality trade-
off is the driving force behind fertility decline. In the model presented in Section 7,
rising wages increase the role of human capital, which induces parents to lower fer-
tility and invest more in the education of their children. Mortality decline does not
strengthen this effect. To the contrary, since mortality decline lowers the cost of every
child equally, it favors quantity over quality and slows fertility decline.
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28A Mathematical Appendix









The assumptions on parameter values(σ, , β ∈ (0,1), s ∈ (0,1], p,q ≥ 0, w,V, p+q >
0) guarantee that (4) is strictly concave in b and that an interior optimum exists. The
optimal number of births b(s) as a function of the survival probability s is character-
ized by the ﬁrst-order condition:
(p + qs) s− b(s)1− 
(w − (p + qs)b(s))σ = β V,( 5 )
which can be written as:
(p + qs)( sb(s))1− 
s1−σ(ws − (p + qs)sb(s))σ = β V
or:
(p/s + q)1−σ (sb(s))1− 
(w/(p/s + q) − sb(s))σ = β V.( 6 )
There is a unique b(s) which satisﬁes (6) for any s. Notice that the term (p/s + q) is
non-increasing in s (strictly decreasing if p > 0), while the term w/(p/s + q) is non-
decreasing in s (strictly increasing if p > 0). Since (6) has to be satisﬁed for all s, sb(s)
is therefore non-decreasing in s (strictly increasing if p > 0), which proves the ﬁrst
part of the claim.
If p = 0, (5) simpliﬁes to:
q (sb(s))1− 
(w − qsb(s))σ = β V.( 7 )
Since s only enters through sb(s), net fertility sb(s) has to be constant for all s to satisfy
(7).
Finally, if q = 0 (5) simpliﬁes to:
pb (s)1− 
s  (w − pb(s))σ = β V.( 8 )
Since the left-hand side is strictly decreasing in s  and (8) has to be satisﬁed for all s,
b(s) is strictly increasing in s, which proves the last part of the claim. 
Proof of Proposition 2: We are considering Model B under the assumption that the
29per-birth cost is zero, p = 0. In this case, Model B is a special case of the model
















The choice problem is to maximize U(b,s) by choice of b,a n dU(n) is strictly concave
in n and does not depend on b or s. The model is now in the form of Sah (1991), and
since the concavity assumption is satisﬁed, the proof for Proposition 2 in Sah (1991)
applies here as well.

To prove Proposition 3, it is useful to ﬁrst develop some additional notation. The
assumptions p = 0a n dsy = 1 are maintained throughout. Let Vt(ht) be the utility at




+ β[(1 − y)n  + y(n + 1) ]V (9)






(1 − y) Vt+1(n,1)+yV t+1(n + 1,1)

(10)
+ γ (1 − bt(n,y)si)

(1 − y) Vt+1(n,0)+yV t+1(n + 1,0)






(1 − y) Vt+1(n,1)+yV t+1(n + 1,1)

(11)
+( 1 − b)

(1 − y) Vt+1(n,0)+yV t+1(n + 1,0)

,
with the additional restriction that bt(n,y)=0f o rt > K. I assume that when a parent
is just indifferent, a birth takes place and bt(n,y)=1. This assumption is for ease of
exposition only and does not affect results. We will also need to consider derivatives
with respect to si. Since the usual derivative may not be well deﬁned for all si (bt is a
30step function), we will use left-hand derivatives. We have
∂VT(n,y)

















Notice that (11) and (12) imply:








These relations will be used below. The following lemma can now be established:
Lemma 1 For all t and y, Vt(n,y) is strictly monotone increasing and weakly concave in n.
bt(n,y) is non-increasing in n. Vt(n,1) − Vt(n,0) is non-increasing in n.
Proof: First, notice that Vt(n,1) is equal to Vt(n + 1,0) apart from the ﬁrst term,
which does not depend on n. Concavity of Vt(n,0) (i.e., Vt(n + 1,0) − Vt(n,0) is non-
increasing in n) is therefore equivalent to Vt(n,1) − Vt(n,0) being non-increasing in
n. The last part of the claim is therefore implied once we prove the ﬁrst part. We also
have:
Vt(n,1) − Vt(n − 1,1)=Vt(n + 1,0) − Vt(n,0). (15)
Monotonicity andconcavity ofVt(n,0) therefore implythesamepropertiesforVt(n,1).
Intheinductionstepbelow, ittherefore sufﬁcestoestablishtheseproperties forVt(n,0).
The proof proceeds by induction. The ﬁrst step is to show that VT(n,y) is strictly
increasing and concave in n. These properties follow directly from the deﬁnition (9).
Since T > K,w ea l s oh a v et h a tbT(n,y)=0, thus bT(n,y) is non-increasing in n.
Now assume that Vt+1(n,y) is strictly increasing and weakly concave in n for y ∈
{0,1}. To complete the induction, we need to show that Vt(n,0) has the same proper-
ties and that bt(n,y) is non-increasing in n. For the last part, it follows from (11) that
bt(n,0)=1 if and only if:
Vt+1(n,1) − Vt+1(n,0) ≥ 0.
Since we assume that Vt+1 is increasing and concave, the difference on the left-hand
side is non-increasing in n, and therefore bt(n,0) is non-increasing in n.T h e s a m e
argument applies to bt(n,1). Next, notice that in (10) Vt(n,0) is a strictly increasing
31function of the Vt+1 on the right-hand side. Since the Vt+1 a r ea s s u m e dt ob es t r i c t l y
increasing in n,r a i s i n gn therefore strictly increases Vt(n,0) even if the birth decision
is held constant. Vt(n,0) is therefore strictly increasing.
Concavity requires more work. We want to show that Vt(n + 1,0) − Vt(n,0) does not
increase with n:
[Vt(n + 1,0) − Vt(n,0)] − [Vt(n,0) − Vt(n − 1,0)] ≤ 0 (16)
for all n. Three cases can be distinguished. Assume ﬁrst that for a given n, bt(n +
1,0)=bt(n,0)=bt(n − 1,0)=b. Writing out (16) for this case gives:
bsi [Vt+1(n + 1,1) − 2Vt+1(n,1)+Vt+1(n − 1,1)]
+( 1 − bsi)[ Vt+1(n + 1,0) − 2Vt+1(n,0)+Vt+1(n − 1,0)] ≤ 0,
which holds because of the assumed concavity of Vt+1, regardless of b. Next, assume
bt(n+1,0)=bt(n,0)=0a n dbt(n −1,0)=1 (notice that we already established that
bt is non-increasing in n given the induction hypothesis). In this case, writing out (16)
gives:
Vt+1(n + 1,0) − 2Vt+1(n,0)+[ si Vt+1(n − 1,1)+ (1 − si) Vt+1(n − 1,0)] ≤ 0 (17)
Notice that since bt(n,0)=0, we must have Vt+1(n,0) > Vt+1(n,1). Since the left-
hand side is increased relative to (17), it is therefore sufﬁcient to show:
Vt+1(n + 1,0) − Vt+1(n,0)
− [si [Vt+1(n,1) − Vt+1(n − 1,1)]+ (1 − si)[ Vt+1(n,0) − Vt+1(n − 1,0)]] ≤ 0. (18)
Because of (15), this is equivalent to:
Vt+1(n + 1,0) − Vt+1(n,0)
− [si [Vt+1(n + 1,0) − Vt+1(n,0)] + (1 − si)[ Vt+1(n,0) − Vt+1(n − 1,0)]] ≤ 0,
which is satisﬁed because of the assumed concavity of Vt+1(n,0). The last case is
bt(n + 1,0)=0a n dbt(n,0)=bt(n − 1,0)=1. Writing out (16) gives:
Vt+1(n + 1,0) − 2[si Vt+1(n,1)+( 1 − si) Vt+1(n,0)]
+

si Vt+1(n − 1,1)+( 1 − si) Vt+1(n − 1,0)

≤ 0. (19)
This time, since bt(n,0)=1, we must have Vt+1(n,0) ≤ Vt+1(n,1).B y t h e s a m e
argument as before, it is sufﬁcient to establish the following condition where the left-
32hand side has is increased relative to (19):
Vt+1(n + 1,0) − Vt+1(n,0)
− [si [Vt+1(n,1) − Vt+1(n − 1,1)]+ (1 − si)[ Vt+1(n,0) − Vt+1(n − 1,0)]] ≤ 0.
This is (18) and therefore satisﬁed. Vt(n,0) is therefore concave, which completes the
proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3: We would like to show that bt(n,y)(si) is non-increasing in
si. From (11), we have that bt(n,y)(si)=1 if and only if:
Vt+1(n + y,1) ≥ Vt+1(n + y,0).







The proof is once again by induction. At time T, condition (20) is trivially satisﬁed
since
VT(n,y)







is satisﬁed for all n. To complete the proof, we need to show that (20) follows at time





























The ﬁrst term is less than or equal to zero since Lemma 1 shows:
Vt+1(n + 1,1) − Vt+1(n + 1,0) ≤ Vt+1(n,1) − Vt+1(n,0)




































which completes the proof. 








Figure 1: Births and Survivors in the Benchmark Model








Figure 2: Births and Survivors in the Binomial Model








Figure 3: Births and Survivors in the Sequential Model








Figure 4: Age at First Birth in the Sequential Model








Figure 5: Births and Survivors in the Binomial Model, σ = 0.01,   = 0.01








Figure 6: Births and Survivors in the Sequential Model, σ = 0.01,   = 0.01








Figure 7: Births and Survivors in the Quantity-Quality Model, 1861 Calibration
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Figure 13: Birth and Infant Mortality Rates in the U.S. (White Population)
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